

TOP SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

2 Nov 1981

File
DRC
Hob

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ROBERT P. JOYCE
POLICY PLANNING STAFF
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Destruction of OPC Agents by Albanian
Security Forces.

REFERENCE: Dept. of State Telegram #563 from Belgrade
dated 26 October 1951.

1. It is assumed that the source of reference is a Radio
Tirana broadcast. This broadcast of 24 October 1951 reported the
"annihilation of 13 spies dropped by parachute on Albanian
territory by United States Espionage Services." Eight of the
thirteen spies were mentioned by name. Seven of the eight men-
tioned have been identified as OPC agents. The attached map de-
picts all OPC teams in Albania at the time of the report and the
location of those agents reported killed.

2. The successful counteraction of Albanian Security forces
may be attributed to one or a combination of the following:

a. A penetration of the NCFA, the Athens field
station, or the OPC training facilities in Germany.

b. A more effective Albanian security force than
has been indicated in intelligence reports to date.
(This possibility is strengthened by the recently re-
ported apprehension in Albania of over forty agents of
other nations.)

c. A need for more thorough agent training.

d. A need for higher calibre agents.

3. The following decisions have been made to date in an at-
tempt to prevent future OPC agent casualties:

a. The covert training site for agents will be
moved.

b. No element of

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

TOP SECRET

110-4

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
DATE	10-1-81
FILE NUMBER	SECRET 572
EXPIRATION DATE	10-1-82

not Regrett..
copy 6

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

b. No element of the National Committee for a Free Albania will be consulted concerning recruitment or planning for 1952 operations.

c. No men will be selected from the Albanian guard company in Germany for agent training. This guard company has been the chief source of OPC agents in the past.

d. Those agents already trained but not yet infiltrated will be disposed of.

e. The field has been asked to report on the feasibility of giving lie detector tests to all agent selectees prior to their movement to the covert training school.

5. More detailed plans for future infiltration operations will be available after consultation with Chief EE-1 upon his return from a current field trip.

[]
Deputy Assistant Director
for Policy Coordination

EE-1/DC/cls
2 November 1951

Distribution:
Orig & #2 - addressee
#3 - SD/RE
#4 & 5 - EE-1

TOP SECRET

copy 6
not regrate